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United States v. Barnette
393 F.3d 775 (4th Cir. 2004)
I. Facts
Aquila Barnette was convicted in federal court of three counts of capital
murder, and the jury sentenced him to death for the carjacking and killing of
Donald Lee Allen and the killing of Robin Williams.' The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction but overturned the
sentence of death and remanded the case to the district court for re-sentencing.2
On remand, a new jury again recommended death on each of the three capital
counts, and Barnette again appealed.3
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit rejected each issue Barnette raised on appeal.' Instead,
the court affirmed the death sentences imposed by the district court.' The
Fourth Circuit determined that the indictment was not deficient because it alleged
at least one aggravating factor, the Federal Death Penalty Act ("FDPA") is
constitutional, the district court did not improperly apply the appropriate aggra-
vating factor, and the use of allegedly inflammatory evidence did not infect the
jury's capital sentencing decision.
1. United States v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775,783 (4th Cit. 2004). Capital counts seven, eight,
and eleven were as follows:
7) commission of a carjacking that results in death, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3);
8) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, namely acat-jacking, in which death occurs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) & (i)2(1);...
11) using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a cnrne of violence, namely
interstate domestic violence, in which death occurs, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
924(c)(1) & (i)2(1).
/Id. For a discussion of the facts surrounding the crime, see generally Christina S. Pignatelli, Case
Note. 13 CAP. DEF.J. 191 (2000) (analyzing United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803 (4th Cir. 2000)).
2. Barnetle, 390 F.3d at 783 (citing United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 808 (4th Cir.
2000)).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 779.
5. Id. Barnette raised ten issues on appeal. Id. at 783-84. Only four of these issues will be
addressed in this case note.
6. Id. at 786, 790, 808, 810.
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III. Analysis
A. Requirements of the Indictment
Citing Ring v. AriZona,7 Barnette asserted that because the statutory aggravat-
ing factors were functional elements of the capital offense, they must be included
in the indictment.8 Barnette is one of several federal death penalty cases founded
upon pre-Ring indictments that raise Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause
issues.9 Barnette argued that the prosecution's failure to allege in the indictment
the statutory aggravating factors upon which the jury based the death sentences
rendered those sentences invalid.' He specifically contended that counts seven
and eight of the indictment did not allege the aggravating factor that he commit-
ted the offense "in the expectation of the receipt of something of pecuniary
value."" Regarding count eleven, Barnette claimed that the indictment failed to
state the aggravating factor that he killed Williams after substantial planning and
premeditation.'
2
The court rejected Barnette's claims concerning the deficiency of counts
seven and eight of the indictment. 3 Although these counts did not explicitly
reference 18 U.S.C. 5 3592(c)(8), the Fourth Circuit concluded that the language
of counts seven and eight fulfilled Ring's requirement that the statutory aggravat-
ing factor be included in the indictment. 4 Because Barnette used Allen's vehicle
7. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
8. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 784; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002) (holding that
"[clapital defendants ... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
conditions an increase in their maximum punishment'); see alsoJones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227,
243 n.6 (1999) (stating that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment"); United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 299
(4th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the FDPA requires the indictment to include at least one aggravat-
ing factor). But see United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 501 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that Ring does
not require the "various aggravating factors ... to be alleged in the indictment").
9. See United States v. Robinson, 367 F.3d 278, 283-84 (5th Cir. 2004) (examining the
sufficiency of the indictment under Ring); United States v. Davis, 380 F.3d 821, 825-29 (5th Cir.
2004) (same); United States v. Allen, 357 F.3d 745, 748-51 (8th Cir. 2004) (same); Higgs, 353 F.3d
at 295-304 (same); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a GrandJury").
10. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 784.
11. Id. at 784-85 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (2004)).
12. Id. at 785.
13. Id.
14. See id. (stating that count seven alleged that the accused, "with intent to cause death or
serious bodily harm, did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully take by force, violence and intimidation,
that is he shot to death and took from ... Allen, a motor vehicle which had been shipped, trans-
ported and received in interstate .. . commerce, that is a ...Honda Prelude'); 18 U.S.C. 5
3592(c)(8) (stating the court will consider as an aggravating factor whether "[tihe defendant
committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of
anything of pecuniary value').
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to drive to Roanoke rather than paying for transportation, the court reasoned
that the stolen Honda Prelude satisfied the pecuniary gain requirement.15 The
court reached the same conclusion with respect to count eight, "inasmuch as
Count 8 explicitly incorporate[d] Count 7." 6
Although count eleven of the indictment did not specifically incorporate the
phrase "substantial planning" from 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(9), the Fourth Circuit
relied upon Hagner v. United States17 to find that the "language must, as a fair
construction, be read into the indictment."'" Because Barnette used Allen's car
to make the three-hour and nearly 200-mile drive from Charlotte to Roanoke and
count ten alleged that he made this trip with the intent to injure Williams, the
court concluded that the defendant "planned his crime and planned to take the
three-hour journey to commit it."'19 Furthermore, because 18 U.S.C. 5 3592
(c)(9)'s substantial planning "means... 'more than the minimum amount suffi-
cient to commit the offense,'" the court found an increased degree of planning
and premeditation.20 Specifically, the Fourth Circuit noted that Barnette not only
planned to murder the victim, but that he also planned and made the three-hour
drive from Charlotte to Roanoke to commit the crime.21 This added component
of the crime fulfilled the statutory aggravating factor of substantial planning and
premeditation.22
The court alternatively added that if the indictment did indeed fail to state
the aggravating factors, the deficiency constituted harmless error. 3 The court
first supported this conclusion by citing the factual background contained in the
indictment from which the statutory aggravating factors could be inferred.24
Moreover, the court noted that the Government had served the defendant with
notice of its intent to seek the death penalty and that this notice included the
statutory aggravating factors that the Government would seek to prove at
sentencing. Barnette made no claim of a lack of adequate notice, and the
indictment could serve as a "defense of double jeopardy for any subsequent
15. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 785.
16. Id.
17. 285 U.S. 427 (1932).
18. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 785; see Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 433 (1932) (holding
that an indictment is not deficient if "the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction
can be found within the terms of the indictment").
19. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 785-86.






25. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 786.
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prosecution of the conduct for which he was found guilty in this case. ' 26 The
court stated that the defendant had no grounds to argue that the Government
"ambushed his defense by attempting to prove previously unknown statutory
aggravating factors at the sentencing hearing.
'27
B. Constitutionality of the Federal Death Penaly Act
Barnette asserted that Ring renders the FDPA unconstitutional .2  Ring
extended to capital cases the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi v. NewJersey9
that" 'any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.' "" Barnette reasoned that the FDPA violates Ring
by treating aggravating factors as sentencing factors that may be inserted into the
case prior to trial by a United States Attorney rather than charged by a grand jury
in an indictment.3 Specifically, the FDPA states that "[i]f... the attorney for the
government believes that the circumstances of the offense are such that a
sentence of death is justified ... the attorney shall" give the court and defendant
notice of both the Government's intention to seek the death penalty and also the
aggravating factors to be used in justifying the sentence.32 Although the statutory
factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they are not statutorily
required to be included in the indictment.3 3 Barnette asserted that because the
FDPA does not require the factors to be included in the indictment, courts
cannot comply with both the FDPA and Ring.3'
Although the Fourth Circuit reviewed de novo the constitutionality of the
FDPA, the court approached the statute with a presumption of validity and then
rejected the defense's argument.35 After reviewing the language and the legisla-
tive history of the FDPA, the Fourth Circuit determined that the statute neither
restricts the grand jury from charging the aggravating factors in the indictment
26. Id. (citing Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962)).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 788; see Ring, 536 U.S. at 589 (holding that statutory aggravating factors necessary
to impose the death penalty must be found by the jury).
29. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
30. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000) (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6).
31. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 788-89.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000).
33. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 789.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 788-90; see United States v. Bostic, 168 F.3d 718, 721 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that
appellate courts review de novo questions of law); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,944 (1983) (stating
that review of a statute "begin[s] ... with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid" and
that "if a challenged action does not violate the Constitution, it must be sustained").
[Vol. 17:2
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nor indicates such congressional intent.' Furthermore, the court stated that
"Ring's holding requires only that such aggravating factors, upon demand, be
found by a jury instead of merely by a judge at sentencing."3
C. Pecuniagy Gain Statutogy Aggravating Factor
Barnette argued that the district court misapplied the aggravating factor of
counts seven and eight, namely that he committed the offense in expectation of
the receipt of anything of pecuniary value. In particular, Barnette contended
that § 3592(c)(8) does not apply to robbery-murders. 39  The Fourth Circuit
reviewed this contention for plain error because the defendant did not raise the
claim before the district court.'
The court distinguished Barnette's case from two cases from the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Tenth Circuits in which the courts
ruled that § 3592(c)(8) did not apply to robbery-murders." Contrary to the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion in United States v. Bernard,2 the court in Barnette found that
"the evidence in the instant case was sufficient for the jury to conclude that
Barnette killed Allen in the expectation of the receipt of something of pecuniary
value, namely Allen's vehicle." ' 3  The court examined Barnette's testimony
regarding the carjacking and murder to support its conclusion that "the motiva-
tion for Allen's murder was... Barnette's need for transportation to Roanoke.""
Moreover, the court determined that, unlike United States v. Chanthadara,4 "the
district court.., properly instructed the jury as to the pecuniary gain statutory
aggravating factor."' The Fourth Circuit concluded that the jury was properly
36. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 789.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 804; see 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (2000) (defining the aggravating factor of"pecuniary
gain" as "[t]he defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expecta-
tion of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value").
39. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 804.
40. Id.
41. Id.; see United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467, 483-84 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that §
3592(c)(8) did not apply to the instant carjacking because the motivation for the murders of the
passenger and driver were to prevent the victims from contacting the police, rather than for
pecuniary gain); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1263 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that
courts must instruct jurors that the murder must have been committed for pecuniary gain, rather
than merely occurring before the robbery).
42. 299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
43. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 807; see Bernard, 299 F.3d at 483-84 (finding that "no pecuniary gain
was expected to flow directly from the homicide').
44. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 808.
45. 230 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2000).
46. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 807; see Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1264 (explaining that the instruction
on the aggravating factor must be clear enough to inform the jury that the murder must be
20051
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instructed and that the evidence supported the jury's § 3592(c)( 8 ) finding that the
defendant murdered Allen in the expectation of the receipt of something of
pecuniary value.47
D. Imposition of the Death Sentence Under the Influence of Passion,
Prejudice, or an Arbitrary Factor
Barnette contended that the Government's introduction of prior criminal
convictions and unadjudicated allegations to prove the aggravating factor of
future dangerousness improperly influenced the jury's decision to sentence him
to death.48 The Government introduced unadjudicated charges of rape, at-
tempted kidnapping, and assault; testimony of a white woman accusing the
defendant of unadjudicated sexual harassment; and convictions for cruelty to
children, assault, felonious restraint, and breaking and entering.49 Although the
jury found that the Government did not prove future dangerousness beyond a
reasonable doubt, the defendant claimed that the district court did not instruct
the jury on how to receive and weigh such potentially prejudicial evidence.
5 0
Because statutory law requires the exclusion of evidence" 'if its probative value
is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice,'" Barnette argued that
the evidence introduced by the Government should not have been admitted at
the sentencing hearing."1
The Fourth Circuit rejected Barnette's arguments.5 2 Although the court first
noted that the evidence was not powerful enough for the jury to find the defen-
dant's future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt, the Fourth Circuit
mentioned neither the racially charged sexual harassment testimony nor its
potentially prejudicial impact on the jury.53 The court next stated that the districtcourt instructed the jury to treat separately each capital count and the evidence
in support of the individual counts, and the Supreme Court has determined that
" '[a] jury is presumed to follow its instructions.' "' Lastly, the Fourth Circuit
focused on the fact that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness was not
"held to be invalid;" rather, the jury found that it was not supported by the
evidence s. 5 The court reasoned that finding in favor of Bamette "would require
committed for pecuniary gain and not merely preceding the robbery).
47. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 807-08.
48. Id. at 809-10.
49. Brief for Appellant at 51-52, United States v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775 (4th Cit. 2004) (No.
02-20) (on file with author).
50. Id. at 16.
51. Id. at 51-52 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000)).
52. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 810.
53. Id.
54. Id. (quoting Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000)).
55. Id.
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separate sentencing hearings and jury verdicts for each non-statutory aggravating
factor that the government seeks to prove. '16 Instead, the FDPA calls for "only
a single sentencing hearing at which the jury will consider evidence that is 'rele-
vant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided.' "" Because
the court determined that the government complied with 5 3593(c), the Fourth
Circuit found no error.5 8
IV. Application in Virginia
A. Requirements of the Indictment
Barnette creates another obstacle to overcome on appeal to the Fourth
Circuit on the grounds that an indictment is deficient for failure to allege a
statutory aggravating factor. In 2003 the Fourth Circuit held in United States v.
Higgs 9 that only one statutory aggravator need be alleged in the indictment to
comply with Ring and the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause.6" Moreover, the
court in Higgs also determined that even if the indictment was deficient for failure
to allege the statutory aggravator, the appellant will not be entitled to relief if the
reviewing court concludes that the error was harmless.6 Barnette now illustrates
the fact that an indictment that does not specifically provide the statutory aggra-
vating factor may still be found adequate if the reviewing court can tease the
statutory aggravator out of the facts given in the indictment's allegations.6 2 The
Fourth Circuit's approach to the requirements of the indictment in Barnette
demonstrates its willingness to infer a required statutory aggravating factor in a
construction of an indictment's allegations.
Barnette further illustrates that even in the event that the statutory aggrava-
tors were inadequately alleged in the indictment, the Fourth Circuit will not
hesitate to find the deficiency to be harmless error.6 3 The court in Barnette
determined that because the government provided the defendant with notice
both of its intention to seek the death penalty and also of the statutory aggravat-
ing factors upon which it would rely at the sentencing hearing, any deficiency in
the indictment constituted merely harmless error.64 This same reasoning was
56. Id. But see United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 898 (4th Cir. 2001) (permitting the
prosecution to submit for the jury's individual consideration forty-six non-statutory aggravating
factors).
57. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 810 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000)).
58. Id.
59. 353 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 2003).
60. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 299-300.
61. Id. at 304.
62. Bamette, 390 F.3d at 785-86.




used by the Fourth Circuit in finding harmless error in Higgs, but such harmless-
error analysis fails to take into account the screening function of the grand jury.
65
The recent decision in Sattazahn v. Pennylvania,66 however, suggests that the
United States Supreme Court may not share the Fourth Circuit's understanding
that a federal defendant is put on adequate notice to defend the charges.67
Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that Ring aggravating factors are elements that
essentially make "the underlying offense of'murder'... a distinct, lesser included
offense of 'murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances.' ,68 The lan-
guage of the Sattatabn opinion implies that murder carrying a life sentence is a
distinct and separate crime from murder carrying a death sentence. Therefore,
"by failing to allege the statutory aggravators in the indictment, the Government
essentially charges the defendant with a lesser crime from the one for which the
defendant will ultimately be prosecuted."'69 Although the Fourth Circuit has
consistently determined the failure to allege the statutory aggravating factors in
the indictment to be harmless error, SattaZabn suggests that challenging a defec-
tive indictment under harmless-error review may not always prove fruitless.
B. Pecuniary Gain Statutory Aggravating Factor
In response to Barnette's assertion that the pecuniary gain statutory aggrava-
tor does not apply to robberies, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the instant case
from two rulings that supported the defendant's claim.7" Contrary to Barnette's
contention, the commission of a robbery, or carjacking, does not automatically
remove the application of the pecuniary gain statutory aggravating factor. Rather,
as the language of § 3592(c)(8) states, the aggravator only applies when "[t]he
defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the
expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value."71 If the perpetrator
committed the murder for a purpose other than pecuniary gain or if the perpetra-
tor completed the robbery and then committed the murder, § 3592(c)(8) is
inapplicable.72 Federal defense counsel faced with a pecuniary gain statutory
65. Higgs, 353 F.3d at 304-07; see K. Brent Tomer, RingAround the GrandJuy: Informing Grand
Jurors of the Capital Consequences ofAggravating Facts, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 61, 79-81 (2004) (discussing the
benefits of a grand jury informed of the significance and effect of aggravating factors in a capital
case).
66. 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
67. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 111 (2003) (plurality opinion).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 804-05.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (2000).
72. See Bernard, 299 F.3d at 483-84 (finding that § 3592(c)(8) did not apply to the instant
carjacking because the motivation for the murders of the passenger and driver was to prevent the
victims from contacting the police rather than for pecuniary gain); Cbanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1263
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aggravating factor should examine the facts and present them in a light that will
separate the robbery/carjacking as distinct from the murder. If the murder was
committed during and to ensure the completion of the robbery/car-jacking,
3592(c)(8) will be applicable as a statutory aggravator.
C Imposition of the Death Sentence Under the Influence of Passion,
Prejudice, or an Arbitray Factor
Over the defense's objection, the court permitted the Government to
introduce into evidence prior convictions and unadjudicated charges to prove
future dangerousness.73 The jury found that the Government failed to prove
future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.74 However, the jurors' expo-
sure to the highly prejudicial information may nevertheless have affected their
decision to return a sentence of death.
Although the Fourth Circuit rejected the assertion that the Government's
evidence in support of the future dangerousness aggravator should have been
excluded as inflammatory, the court's opinion in Barnette omitted reference to the
most prejudicial evidence offered by the Government. Barnette testified that he
had been discharged from employment at a Camelot music store for making
inappropriate comments to a female co-worker and light-heartedly slapping her
on the buttocks.75 Over the defense's objection, the court permitted the Govern-
ment to present rebuttal testimony to counter Barnette's version of this
incident.76 The young white woman took the stand and testified in detail regard-
ing alleged vulgar and sexual comments the defendant, a black man, directed
toward her.77 The district court overruled the defense's objection to the testi-
mony as non-rebuttal and alternatively as prejudicial.78
Despite the Fourth Circuit's failure to recognize the racially inflammatory
significance of a Southern white woman's testimony regarding a black man's
sexual advances, capital defense counsel should always object to the introduction
of such evidence. The FDPA provides that at capital sentencing proceedings,
"information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger
of creating unfair prejudice."79 Although deference is given to the judgment of
the trial judge when examining the admission of allegedly prejudicial evidence,
(stating that courts must instruct jurors that the murder must have been committed for pecuniary
gain rather than merely occurring before the robbery).
73. Bamette, 390 F.3d at 809-10.
74. Id. at 809.
75. Brief for Appellant at 51, Barnete, (No. 02-20).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 51-52.
78. Id. at 52.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000).
2005]
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the prejudicial content of the testimony such as that provided by Barnette's
former co-worker surely outweighed its probative value as rebuttal testimony.
. Conclusion
In Barne#e, the Fourth Circuit rejected each of the defendant's arguments,
including the four discussed in this case note. The court concluded that a fair
construction of the facts in the indictment is enough to find an indictment
adequate despite its failure to allege the statutory aggravator.8" Although the
court's alternative reliance on harmless error further suggests that an appeal on
the grounds of a deficient indictment will fall on deaf ears in the Fourth Circuit,
the language of Sattazahn implies that such a claim may not be as readily dis-
missed by the Supreme Court.8 Barnette also reaffirmed the constitutionality of
the FDPA in light of Ring.82 Third, the Fourth Circuit clarified that the pecuniary
gain statutory aggravator is applicable in a robbery/carjacking case if the murder
was committed in furtherance or to complete the robbery/carjacking.83 Finally,
Barnette appears to suggest a reluctance on the part of the Fourth Circuit to
address squarely the ramifications of such racially charged evidence as a com-
plaint of sexual harassment, despite the fact that a man's life potentially rested
upon the district court's decision to admit such prejudicial evidence during the
capital sentencing proceeding.
Mark J. Goldsmith
80. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 786; see Hagner, 285 U.S. at 433 (holding that an indictment is not
deficient if "the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can be found within the
terms of the indictment").
81. Sattazabn, 537 U.S. at 111.
82. Barnette, 390 F.3d at 790.
83. Id. at 806-08.
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